American Fork City v. Jolayne Fairbanks : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
American Fork City v. Jolayne Fairbanks : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bruce Murdock; Duval, Hansen, Witt and Morley; Counsel for Appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight and Esplin; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, American Fork City v. Fairbanks, No. 970508 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1035
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
AMERICAN iw^» v^*, 970508-CA 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ;• Priority Nc 
JOLAYNE FKIKhAlii^, 
<t 
J 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL uioxnu-i OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, RE THE HONORABLE 
JOHN C. BACKLUND, FROM A CONVICTION OF ASSAULT, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102, 
AS ADOPTED BY AMERICAN FORK f ORDINANCE. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: (801) 
Counsel for AppexxcuiL 
BRUCE R. MURDOCK, Bar No. 6948 
Duval Hansen Witt & Morley, P.C. 
306 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-7658 
Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUES PRESENTED 1 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS . . 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I JUDGE BACKLUND DID NOT CLEARLY ABUSE HIS 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT KARI FISHER WAS 
AN UNAVAILABLE WITNESS AND ADMITTING HER 
OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS INTO EVIDENCE. . 5 
A. Ms. Fisher was a constitutionally 
unavailable witness 6 
B. Ms. Fisher's statements were sufficiently 
reliable 9 
C. If there was error, it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt 11 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 13 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory Provisions 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 2,3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 1 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803 1, 11 
Utah Rule of Evidence 804 2 
Cases Cited 
Johnston v. Ohls, 457 P.2d 194 (Wash. 1969) 13 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) 9 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) 6-8 
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982) 1, 5 
State V. Cude, 784 P. 2d 1197 (Utah 1989) 12, 13 
State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890 (Utah App. 1990, cert, denied, 
804 P. 2d 1232 (Utah 1990) 6-8 
State v. Kaytso, 684 P. 2d 63 (Utah 1984) 12 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) 6 
State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1992) . . . 12 
State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah 1990) 1 
State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1989) 6 
United States v. Bowman, 609 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) . 8, 9 
ii 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as 
amended). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUES PRESENTED 
Defendant appeals the trial court's admission into 
evidence of statements of an unavailable witness pursuant to an 
exception to the hearsay rule In general, evidentiary rulings 
are reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1990). Specific to the issue 
presented in this case, an evidentiary ruling admitting 
testimony of an unavailable witness into evidence pursuant to 
an exception to the hearsay rule is also reviewed for a clear 
abuse of discretion. State v. Chapman, *»'"»"'" I1. 2d ' ! JIL*, L122 
(Utah 1982). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AMENDMENT VI, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for 
his defence. 
UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 803 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness: 
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement 
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relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition. 
UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 804 
(a) Definition of unavailability. 
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in 
which the declarant: 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the 
proponent of the declarant's statement has been 
unable to procure the declarant's attendance by 
process or other reasonable means. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing 
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court 
determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement 
is more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these 
rules and the interests of justice will be best 
served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing 
to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
proponent's intention to offer the statement and 
the particulars of it, including the name and 
address of the declarant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant appeals her conviction and sentence imposed 
by the Honorable John C. Backlund after a trial held before him 
on April 25, 1997, in which she was convicted of Assault, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 
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(1953 as amended), as adopted by American Fork City ordinance. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Defendant was charged with Assault in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 as adopted by American Fork City 
ordinance, by an information filed on or about January 3, 1997. 
Trial was conducted before the Honorable John C. Backlund on 
April 25, 1997, at the close of which Defendant was found 
guilty as charged. (Tr. at 24). Defendant was sentenced on 
July 16, 1997 to pay a fine of $100.00 and given a suspended 
jail sentence of 10 days. Further, she was put on probation 
for one year and ordered to have no contact with the victim, 
directly or indirectly. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On December 23, 1996 at around 10:30 a.m., Officer 
Andrew Hale of the American Fork City Police Department was 
dispatched to an American Fork City address on a report of a 
fight. (Tr. at 4). Officer Hale responded to the location and 
found two females present, Defendant Jolayne Fairbanks and Kari 
Fisher. Id. One of the females, Kari Fisher, was very 
emotional and crying. Id. Officer Hale observed a fresh cut 
on Ms. Fisher's nose but did not observe any signs of injury on 
Defendant. (Tr. at 10-11). 
Officer Hale attempted to separate the two females 
and ascertain what had happened. (Tr. at 4). Ms. Fisher 
stated that she and Defendant were in the process of separating 
and that Defendant was supposed to have moved out. Defendant 
3 
had returned that morning and while Ms. Fisher was sitting on 
the toilet, Defendant entered the bathroom, grabbed her by the 
hair and punched her in the face. (Tr. at 10). Ms. Fisher 
then stated that she hit Defendant back and then left the house 
to go call the police from her sister's house, because there 
wasn't a phone in Ms. Fisher's residence. Id. Officer Hale 
did not see any signs of injury on Defendant. (Tr. at 11). 
Ms. Fisher's mother, Marian Koginnes, testified that 
at around 10:00 a.m. on the morning of December 23, 1996, Kari 
Fisher came to her house. (Tr. at 14). According to Ms. 
Koginnes, Ms. Fisher was "very excited, emotional. She had 
blood coming out of her nose and I tried to wipe it. Her hair 
was sticking up." Id. 
Kari Fisher was served with a subpoena to appear at 
trial and testify. (Tr. at 5). However, she did not appear. 
Id. The City was unaware that Ms. Fisher would not obey the 
subpoena and appear at trial until the time of trial. (Tr. at 
6). 
At trial, the court originally allowed Officer Hale 
to testify regarding Ms. Fisher's statements made to him at the 
scene pursuant to both the unavailable witness and excited 
utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. (Tr. at 9-10). 
Later, the court changed its ruling regarding the admissibility 
of the statements under the excited utterance exception and 
continued to allow them into evidence under the unavailable 
witness exception. (Tr. at 13). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Backlund did not clearly abuse his discretion 
by allowing Officer Hale to testify as to what Kari Fisher told 
him at the scene of the assault, Ms. Fisher was properly 
served with a subpoena and refused to obey it, making her a 
constitutionally unavailable witness. The City had no 
difficulty locating Ms. Fisher and was unaware that she would 
refuse to obey the subpoena and not appear at trial. Further, 
her statements were corroborated by her obvious emotional 
state, the signs of physical injury on her person and her 
disheveled appearance, as testified to by Officer Hale and 
Marian Koginnes. 
If there was error, it would be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt as Ms. Fisher's statements could have been 
admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE BACKLUND DID NOT CLEARLY ABUSE HIS DISCRETION 
IN FINDING THAT KARI FISHER WAS AN UNAVAILABLE 
WITNESS AND ADMITTING HER STATEMENTS INTO EVIDENCE 
In order for this Court to reverse Defendant's 
conviction, it must find that the trial court clearly abused 
its discretion in finding that Kari Fisher was an unavailable 
witness and admitting her out-of-court statements into 
evidence. State v. Chapman. 655 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982). 
The City made reasonable, good faith efforts to procure 
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Fisher's attendance at trial by serving her with a subpoena, 
and she refused to appear. 
Furthermore, Ms. Fisher's out-of-court statements 
were strongly corroborated by Officer Hale's and Marian 
Koginnes' observations of her emotional state and physical 
injuries consistent with being punched in the face, as Ms. 
Fisher's out-of-court statement described. 
A. Fisher was a Constitutionally Unavailable 
Witness 
Constitutional unavailability of a witness is found 
only when it is "practically impossible to produce the witness 
in court." State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1113 (Utah 1989) 
(separate opinion of Zimmerman, J.)). 
Fairbanks cites State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 893 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), and 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981), in support of her 
argument that the City did not demonstrate that it was 
practically impossible to produce Ms. Fisher at trial. 
However, these cases are distinguished from the case at bar. 
In Drawn, the State attempted to produce two 
witnesses at trial, Genova Marcellus and Rosemary Mar. The 
deputy county attorney mailed subpoenas to Marcellus on three 
different occasions, which she received and subsequently 
indicated to the prosecutor through her mother that she 
intended to attend the trial. Drawn, 791 P.2d at 893, n. 3. 
The subpoenas mailed to Mar were returned by the postal service 
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as undeliverable. Id. The police made further efforts to 
locate Mar by questioning police informants, searching police 
files, and working with a Salt Lake County investigator, all of 
which were unsuccessful. Id. at 893. At the time of trial, 
neither witness showed. The court then allowed the witnesses7 
prior statements to the investigating police officer to be 
admitted into evidence pursuant to the unavailable witness 
exception to the hearsay rule. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the State made reasonable, good faith 
efforts to produce the witnesses at trial, but was 
unsuccessful. Therefore, the witnesses were constitutionally 
unavailable for purposes of the confrontation clause. Id. at 
893-94. 
In Brooks, the State attempted to produce two 
witnesses at trial who were victims of an assault. Both 
witnesses had testified previously at a preliminary hearing. 
However, the victims were transients and had left the county 
prior to the trial taking place. A police officer testified 
that he had made various attempts to locate the witnesses after 
they had left the county, and was unsuccessful. Brooks, 638 
P.2d at 539. The defendant argued that other and earlier 
attempts could have been made to locate the witnesses. Id. 
Neither witness was served with a subpoena. Id. at 540. The 
court allowed the prior testimony under the unavailable witness 
exception and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed saying, "Although 
in retrospect other efforts might have been made, the 
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determination does not appear to us to be an abuse of 
discretion." Id. 
Unlike the facts present in Drawn and Brooks, the 
City did not have any trouble locating Ms. Fisher to serve her 
with a subpoena. Indeed, unlike the witnesses sought by the 
State in Drawn and Brooks, Ms. Fisher was properly served with 
a subpoena ordering her to appear at trial and give testimony. 
No indication was ever made to the City that Ms. Fisher would 
refuse to comply with the subpoena and not appear at trial and 
testify. 
Fairbanks argues that the City should have moved for 
a continuance and sought an order to show cause requiring Ms. 
Fisher to appear and show cause why she did not obey the 
subpoena. According to Fairbanks, this would satisfy the 
City's burden of making a good faith effort to produce Ms. 
Fisher at trial. As indicated in Brooks, in retrospect, the 
City could have made other efforts to produce Ms. Fisher at 
trial. However, the City had already acted in the manner that 
is usually satisfactory to produce a witness at trial by 
serving Ms. Fisher with a lawfully issued subpoena ordering her 
appearance at trial. The City had no idea that Ms. Fisher 
would refuse to obey the subpoena. Judge Backlund recognized 
this at trial, and in his discretion allowed Officer Hale to 
testify to the statements made to him at the scene by Ms. 
Fisher regarding the incident she had reported. 
In United States v. Bowman, 609 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 
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1979), the defendant was tried a second time after the previous 
trial ended in a mistrial. A witness for the government that 
testified at the prior trial had moved to California between 
the first and second trials without notifying the prosecution. 
Id. at 19. The government had mailed a subpoena to the witness 
at her last known address, and the prosecutor informed the 
court that he had later learned about her move and that she 
would not return for several days. Id. The Court allowed the 
witness's prior testimony to be admitted into evidence under 
the unavailable witness exception to the hearsay rule and the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that the witness 
was unavailable. Id. at 19. 
Based on the facts presented by this case, Judge 
Backlund did not clearly abuse his discretion by ruling that 
Kari Fisher was constitutionally unavailable and allowing 
Officer Hale to testify as to Ms. Fisher's statements made to 
him at the scene of the assault. 
B. Ms. Fisher's Statements Were Sufficiently 
Reliable 
Fairbanks next argues that Ms. Fisher's statements 
were not sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence, as 
is required by the second prong of the constitutionally 
unavailable witness rule as provided by Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980). 
However, the testimony presented at trial of Officer 
Hale's and Marian Koginnes' observations strongly corroborated 
the statements made by Ms. Fisher to Officer Hale that Judge 
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Backlund allowed into evidence. Officer Hale testified that 
when he arrived on the scene of the assault, he found two 
women, Fairbanks and Ms. Fisher. (Tr. at 4). Only one of the 
women, Ms. Fisher, was very emotional and crying. Id. 
According to Officer Hale, Ms. Fisher had a fresh laceration on 
her nose. (Tr. at 10). Fairbanks, on the other hand, did not 
have any signs of physical injury. (Tr. at 11). According to 
Marian Koginnes, who saw Ms. Fisher before Officer Hale did, 
Ms. Fisher came to her house to call the police and was very 
excited and emotional. (Tr. at 14). Further, Ms. Fisher had 
blood coming out of her nose and her hair was sticking up. Id. 
The observations of these two witnesses strongly 
corroborate the out of court statements made by Ms. Fisher to 
Officer Hale regarding what had happened. Ms. Fisher told 
Officer Hale that she had been sitting on the toilet when 
Fairbanks entered the bathroom, grabbed her by the hair, and 
punched her in the face. Ms. Fisher hit Fairbanks back, then 
left the residence to go to her sister's house to call the 
police. (Tr. at 10). All of these facts are consistent with 
the statements made by Ms. Fisher at the scene that she was the 
victim of an assault perpetrated by Fairbanks. 
Consequently, Judge Backlund did not clearly abuse 
his discretion in ruling that Ms. Fisher's out-of-court 
statements were sufficiently reliable for constitutional 
purposes. 
10 
C If There Was Error, It Was Harmless Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt. 
Fairbanks argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting Ms. Fisher's out-of-court statements into evidence 
and that such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
entitling her to a reversal and acquittal of the charges made 
against her. However, any error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt as Ms. Fisher's statements could have been 
admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(2) states: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule, even though the declarant is available as a 
witness: 
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to 
a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused 
by the startling event or condition. 
In the instant case, when Officer Hale first 
encountered Ms. Fisher she was very emotional and crying. She 
had a fresh cut on her nose. She reported that she had been 
punched in the face by Fairbanks while she was sitting on the 
toilet. Originally, Judge Backlund allowed Ms. Fisher's out-
of-court statements into evidence pursuant to the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. However, when the 
evidence showed that Ms. Fisher had travelled to her sister's 
house to call the police and then back to the scene of the 
assault before making her statements to Officer Hale, Judge 
Backlund ruled that there was a sufficient intervening time to 
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render the statements inadmissible under the excited utterance 
exception. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a three-pronged 
test for determining whether a statement is admissible under 
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. According 
to this test, a statement constitutes an excited utterance when 
(1) a startling event or condition occurred, (2) the statement 
was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 
caused by the event or condition, and (3) the statement relates 
to the startling event or condition. State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 
1197, 1200 (Utah 1989); State v. Mickelson. 848 P.2d 677, 683 
(Utah App. 1992). 
In the instant case, the first and third prongs of 
the test are clearly met. The only question therefore, is 
whether Ms. Fisher was under the stress of excitement caused by 
the startling event when she made her statements to Officer 
Hale. Judge Backlund ruled that an approximate thirty minute 
to one hour interval between the time of the assault and the 
time the statements were made rendered the statement 
inadmissible as not being made while Ms. Fisher was under the 
stress of excitement caused by the assault. 
According to State v. Kaytso, 684 P.2d 63 (Utah 
1984) , 
the crucial question in all cases is whether the 
statement was made while the declarant was still 
under the influence of the event to the extent that 
his statement could not be the result of fabrication, 
intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or 
j udgment. 
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Id, at 64 (quoting Johnston v. Ohls. 457 P.2d 194 (Wash. 
1969)). Further, "it is not necessarily the time lapse that 
disqualifies a statement as an excited utterance, but rather 
the determination that the declarant was no longer under the 
stress of the event." Cude, 784 P.2d at 1200. 
In the instant case, Judge Backlund ruled that the 
intervening lapse of time between the assault on Kari Fisher 
and her statements to Officer Hale, approximately thirty 
minutes to one hour, rendered her statements inadmissible under 
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. (Tr. at 
12-13). However, the facts clearly indicate that Ms. Fisher 
was still under the stress of the assault when she made her 
statements to Officer Hale. Consequently, her statements could 
have been admitted under the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule, and any error by the court in admitting them 
under the unavailable witness exception would be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Judge Backlund did not clearly abuse his discretion 
in admitting Kari Fisher's out-of-court statements into 
evidence pursuant to the unavailable witness exception to the 
hearsay rule. Ms. Fisher had been served with a subpoena and 
refused to comply, making her constitutionally unavailable. 
Her statements were sufficiently reliable and strongly 
corroborated by the observations of the witnesses who testified 
at trial. Further, if there was error it was harmless beyond a 
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reasonable doubt as Ms. Fisher's out-of-court statements could 
have been admitted under the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule. Therefore, the conviction and sentence imposed 
upon Fairbanks should be affirmed by this court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3O day of March, 1998. 
Bruce R. Murdock 
Counsel for American Fork City 
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